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I. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WAGE & PRICE CONTROL LEGISLA-
TION
In Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally,' a three-judge panel
of the District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of 19702 (ESA) and the
subsequent Executive Order 11615,1 which had established a ninety-
day wage and price freeze, against the claim that the Act constituted
an excessive delegation of power to the President in violation of the
principle of separation of powers.' The Economic Stabilization Act
authorized the President "to issue such orders and regulations as he
may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries
at levels not less than those prevailing on May 25, 1970," with such
adjustments as might be necessary "to prevent gross inequities." '
Executive Order 11615 implemented the authority conferred by the
ESA and directed that "[p]rices, rents, wages, and salaries . . . be
stabilized for a period of 90 days" at levels not greater than the
highest of those actually in effect with respect to "a substantial vol-
ume of transactions" during the preceding thirty days.' The Executive
1. _F. Supp.- (D.D.C. 1971).
2. Act of Aug. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 799 (set forth in note following 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1970)),
as amended, Act of Dec. 17, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-558, 84 Stat. 1468; Act of March 31, 197 1,
Pub. L. No. 92-8, 85 Stat. 13; Act of May 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-15, 85 Stat. 38; Act of
Dec. 22, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743. The Act was part of a measure providing for
amendments to the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.Appendix §§ 2061-2168 (1970).
Since the decision in Amalgamated Meat Cutters, the Economic Stabilization Act has been
further amended. Act of Dec. 22, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743 (1971).
3. 36 Fed. Reg. 15727 (1971).
4. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § I provides: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States .... "
5. Economic Stabilization Act § 202, 84 Stat. 799 (1970).
6. Exec. Order No. 11615, § I(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 15727 (1971). The order was effective from
Aug. 15 to Nov. 13, 1971. The thirty-day period determinative of "a substantial volume of
transactions" was that ending on August 14, 1971. Raw agricultural products were exempted
from these controls. Id. § l(c). Persons in the business of selling or providing commodities or
services were required by the order to "maintain available for public inspection a record of the
highest prices or rents charged" during the prior thirty days. Id. § I (b).
Section 205 of the Economic Stabilization Act authorized the Administration to seek injunc-
tions in federal district court to secure compliance with the Act, and section 204 provided for a
fine of up to $5000 for willfully violating an order or regulation issued pursuant to the Act.
These provisions were incorporated in section 7 of the Executive Order, with the addition of
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Order also established the Cost of Living Council "as an agency of
the United States' 7 and delegated to the Council "all the powers
conferred on the President" by the Economic Stabilization Act.8 The
union sought to have the Act and Executive Order declared unconsti-
tutional and to enjoin the Cost of Living Council from their further
implementation?
Although the doctrine of separation of powers is a cornerstone of
the American constitutional system, 10 since the inception of the Re-
public, practical considerations have led to delegations of power
which might properly be characterized as "legislative" to the execu-
tive branch." Orthodox American judicial theory, however, long ad-
hered to the view that a delegation of authority by one branch of
government to another was impermissible because power that had
been conferred by the sovereign could not in turn be passed on by the
recipient branch.'2 As the nation grew and society became more com-
words "for each such violation" immediately after the language authorizing the fine. Id. § 7(a),
36 Fed. Reg. at 15729. This language of the Executive Order was adopted in section 208 of the
Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971 (eff. Dec. 22, 1971), 85 Stat. 743.
7. Exec. Order No. 11615 § 2(a), 36 Fed. Reg. 15727 (1971).
8. Id. § 3(a), 36 Fed. Reg. at 15 728. Although this section of the Order grants to the Cost
of Living Council all the powers conferred to the President "[e]xcept as otherwise provided
herein ..... no such limitations or exceptions are indicated in the Order.
9. In count II of the complaint the union sought to compel the meat packing companies to
grant a general wage increase of $0.25 per hour, effective Sept. 6, 1971, as provided by the
union's contract. - F. Supp. at _ .
10. Abdication of responsibility by the legislature frustrates the will of the electors as
manifested in the election process, especially if the new locus of power is not directly responsible
to the electorate. Even assuming the identity of legislative interests with the policies and actions
of the new power center, thereby assuring that the public will is carried out, democratic theory
is compromised when legislative power is exercised by non-elected ministers or by elected
officials chosen to perform non-legislative duties by the very fact of such exercise itself. Cf. J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY 14 (1839); J. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING THE
TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 141 (1690), wherein it is stated:
"The Legislative cannot transfer the Power of making laws to any other hands, for it being
but a delegated Power from the People, they who have it cannot pass it over to others."
II. In its early sessions, Congress authorized the President, among other things, to fix the
salaries of officers engaged in foreign service on behalf of the United States, Act of July 1, 1790,
ch. 22, § I, 1 Stat. 128, and to prescribe regulations for trade with the Indians, Act of April
18, 1796, ch. 13, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 452. See generally B. PUTNEY, DELEGATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY 424 (EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS Vol. 1I, No. 20, 1935). Interestingly, these
measures did not include a statement of legislative findings that delegation of such duties to the
President was warranted or necessary under the circumstances.
12. Cf. Cheadle, The Delegation of Legislative Functions, 27 YALE L.J. 892, 893-94 (1918).
See generally Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-93 (1892); Duff & Whiteside, Delegata Potestas
non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 168 (1929).
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plex, congressional willingness to delegate authority to the President
increased, 13 culminating by the end of the nineteenth century in the
establishment of administrative agencies 4 charged with carrying out
programs enunciated by Congress only in terms of general principles.
The courts accepted these innovations' 5 even though they presented
fundamental problems in democratic theory."1
Two significant exceptions to the judicial acceptance of increased
delegation to the executive branch arose after the enactment of the
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1933.'1 The Act gave
the President authority to approve codes of fair competition proposed
by trade or industrial groups, 8 the power to prevent the continued
operation of businesses not complying with such codes, 9 authority to
regulate certain facets of the petroleum industry,20 and broad rule-
making powers to implement the purposes of the Act.2' In Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan,2 2 the Supreme Court held that section 9(c) of
13. Cf. J. COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES
17-18 (1927). Congress "came to see that it could not accomplish alone the aims it was
continuously visualizing." As a result, there has occurred "a conscious effort to delegate to the
'expertise' a large portion of the burden which congressmen had been unable to carry because
of impolicy or impracticability." Id. at 18.
14. See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 383 (1887); 49 U.S.C. §§ I
et seq. (1970).
15. See, e.g., In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526 (1897); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Brig
Aurora v. United States, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). See generally DAVIS §§ 2.0 1-.10.
Professor Davis observes that the judicial retreat from the doctrine of non-delegation has
occurred in several steps. After recognition of an authority to formulate administrative rules as
distinguished from delegation of legislative power, courts opposed delegation which lacked
adequate standards to guide administrative actions. Id. § 2.01, at 27; see notes 23-33 infra and
accompanying text. The final phase involved upholding highly ambiguous standards, a develop-
ment which perhaps rendered meaningless the initial requirement of a standard. DAVIS § 2.01,
at 27; see notes 34-40 infra and accompanying text.
16. See note l0supra.
17. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90,48 Stat. 195 (1933). The NIRA was intended
to stimulate economic growth and employment by direct expenditures on public works, and
through cooperation between government and private industry. Hearings on H.R. 5664 Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1933). See generally M.
FINKELSTEIN, THE DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 1-14 (1933); M. GALLAGHER, GOVERN-
MENT RULES INDUSTRY 4-18 (1934) (discussing Title I of the NIRA).
18. NIRA § 3,48 Stat. 196 (1933).
19. Id. § 4, 48 Stat. at 197. The President was authorized to establish a licensing procedure
for industries or trades for which codes of fair competition had been established and (after
hearing) to suspend or revoke the licenses of persons refusing to comply with the applicable
code, thereby denying them the right to engage in such trade or industry.
20. Id. § 9, 48 Stat. at 200.
21. Id. § 10,48 Stat. at 200.
22. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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the N I RA, which permitted the President to prohibit the transporta-
tion of petroleum products produced in excess of state-established
quotas, constituted an excessive delegation of authority to the Presi-
dent because it gave him "unlimited authority to determine the policy
and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see
fit."'24 The Court's decision was predicated on the finding that Con-
gress had prescribed no standards to guide the President, 25 and it
concluded that if section 9(c) were upheld "it would be idle to pretend
that anything would be left of limitations upon the power of Congress
to delegate its lawmaking function.1 2
In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,2 7 the second
important exception to judicial acceptance of legislative delegation,
the Supreme Court held that section 3 of the NIRA, which provided
for industry and trade promulgation of "codes of fair competition"
that "effectuate the policy of this title" to be effective upon presiden-
tial approval,28 was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
23. 48 Stat. 200 (1933).
24. 293 U.S. at415.
25. After examining at length other portions of the NI RA from which the President might
derive guidance, id. at 416-19, the Court concluded: "[t]here is no requirement, no definition
of circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited."
Id. at 430.
26. Id. at 430. The Panama case is also notable for the fact that the two lower courts ruled
upon an administrative provision which had been eliminated. Its revocation was unknown to
both the plaintiffs and the Government attorneys, and the error was not discovered until certio-
rari had been granted by the Supreme Court. Id. 410-13. This error, embarrassing to all parties,
gave impetus to the movement to codify federal regulations. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:
OFFICE AND POWERS 367-68 n.29 (2d ed. 1941); Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative
Power 11, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 571 (1947).
27. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
28. 48 Stat. 196 (1933). The standards and other safeguards provided for the guidance of
the President (aside from the policy declaration in section 1, see note 30 infra), set forth in
section 3, were as follows: (1) that the codes be "codes of fair competition"; (2) that the trade
associations promulgating the code have no inequitable restriction on membership and be truly
representative; (3) that the codes not promote monopolies or monopolistic practices; (4) that
the codes not discriminate against small enterprises; and (5) that there be a right to a hearing
prior to approval of the code for persons not within the trade or industry who would be affected
by it. NIRA § 3(a), 48 Stat. 196 (1933).
Section 3 authorized the President to impose such conditions as he deemed necessary (e.g.,
requiring reports and financial statements) to protect the public interest, as a condition of code
approval. In addition, the President was authorized to impose codes on his own initiative, after
a hearing, if "abuses inimical to the public interest and contrary to the policy herein declared"
were present. Id. § 3(d), 48 Stat. at 196. Violation of the codes constituted a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of $500, each day of violation constituting a separate offense. Id. § 3(f),
48 Stat. at 197.
Vol. 1972:1151
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
power. It specifically rejected the suggestion that the term "fair com-
petition" could be construed so as to limit the codes to proscribing
unfair competition and, indeed, the Government did not contend that
the NIRA contemplated such a limitation. 9 The Court also found
the "Declaration of Policy" 3 to be too broad to provide proper stan-
dards to guide the President, concluding that his "discretion . . . in
thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry through-
out the country, is virtually unfettered."' 3' The Panama and Schechter
decisions are the only cases in which congressional delegations of
legislative authority to the executive branch were found to be uncon-
stitutionally excessive. Both cases make it clear that some minimum
standards must be legislatively prescribed to guide the President, but
leave uncertain the precise degree of specificity required. 3 During
World War II Congress again delegated to the President extensive
powers to control the economy. The Emergency Price Control Act
(EPCA), enacted in 1942,3 created the Office of Price Administra-
29. 295 U.S. at 531-32. The Court took a similar position with respect to the phrase "unfair
methods of competition" which is used in the FTC Act. Id. at 533-34. In its analysis the Court
also observed that a delegation of legislative power to trade associations was entirely inconsis-
tent with the Constitution. Id. at 537. Consequently the decision clearly turned upon the power
of the executive to institute the codes.
30. NIRA § 1, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). After declaring a national state of emergency, section
I (paraphrased below), delineated the following goals:
(1) the removal of obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce;
(2) to promote the general welfare through the following means:
(a) cooperative action by industry.
(b) united action by labor and management.
(c) the elimination of unfair competition.
(d) the fullest utilization of productive capacities.
(e) the avoidance of undue restriction of productive capacity, except as tempo-
rarily required.
(f) increased consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing
purchasing power.
(g) reduction of unemployment.
(h) improvement of labor standards.
(i) rehabilitation of industry.
(j) the conservation of natural resources.
31. 295 U.S. at 538-39, 541-42. The Court was also critical of the procedure provided for
promulgating the codes, comparing them unfavorably with the more formal methods provided
for other administrative agencies. Included in this criticism was a reference to the difficulty of
conducting judicial review under the NIRA. Id. at 533.
32. Precisely what are the minimum standards can, at best, be inferred only negatively from
the numerous faults attributed to the NI RA by the Court in the two decisions. See generally E.
CORWIN, supra note 26, at 120-23.
33. 56 Stat. 23, as amended, id. at 765 (1942).
34. EPCA § 201, 56 Stat. 29 (1942). The direction of the Office of Price Administration
and authority to make final decisions under the EPCA were vested in a "Price Administrator"
appointed by the President.
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tion"4 to "establish such . . . maximum prices as . . . will be gener-
ally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of this Act."35
More specific guidance was provided to the Price Administrator as
follows:
So far as practicable, in establishing any maximum price, the Administrator
shall ascertain and give due consideration to the prices prevailing between
October I and October 15. 1941 .... 11
In Yakus v. United States3 7 the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the EPCA and regulations prescribed pursuant thereto, finding that
they did not contain the defects found by the Panama and Schechter
Coujis in the NIRA. In Yakus the Court described the legislative
function as one containing two essentials: (1) the determination of
legislative policy; and (2) the formulation and promulgation of that
policy as a binding rule of conduct.39 "These essentials are pre-
35. Id. § 2(a), 56 Stat. at 24. The primary purposes of the Act were: "to stabilize prices
and to prevent speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal increases in prices and rents; to elimi-
nate and prevent profiteering, hoarding, manipulation, speculation, and other disruptive prac-
tices resulting from abnormal market conditions or scarcities caused by or contributing to the
national emergency. ... The foregoing was followed by a recitation of specific evils which
might result from uncontrolled inflation intended to be prevented by the Act. Id. § 1 (a), 56 Stat.
at 23-24.
36. EPCA § 2(a), 56 Stat. at 24. Section 2 of the EPCA was applicable only to commodi-
ties. Agricultural products were covered under section 3, 56 Stat. 27. When the Act was subse-
quently amended the President was authorized "to issue [within 30 days] a general order
stabilizing prices, wages, and salaries affecting the cost of living. . . on the basis of levels which
existed on September 15, 1942." 56 Stat. 765. In addition to changing the base period, this
broadened the scope of the EPCA's coverage by permitting the issuance of a comprehensive
order rather than an order fixing an individual commodity's price. Further guidance was pro-
vided the President as follows: "Etihe President may ... provide for making adjustments with
respect to prices, wages, and salaries, to the extent that he finds necessary to aid in the effective
prosecution of the war or to correct gross inequitites."Id. The amendment to the EPCA also
contained separate provisions for agricultural products. 56 Stat. 766 (1942). Notably, the EPCA
also provided for judicial review by an Emergency Court of Appeals. EPCA § 204, 56 Stat.
31 (1942).
37. 321 U.S. 414 (1944), discussed in Note, Administrative Law: Emergency Price Control
Act: Constitutional Delegation of Legislative Powers to Administrative Agencies, 30 CORNELL
L.Q. 504 (1945).
38. 321 U.S. at 424. Interestingly, the Court concluded that the directions that prices should
be fixed at a level which is fair and equitable and that they should promote the purposes of the
EPCA, see text preceding note 36 supra, conferred "no greater reach for administrative determi-
nation than the power to fix just and reasonable rates . . . or the power to approve consolida-
tions in the 'public interest.'" 321 U.S. at 427. Compare the term "fair competition" as used
in the NIRA. See note 28 supra.
39. 321 U.S. at 424-25. The Court indicated that it was no objection that the ascertainment
of the fact called "for the exercise of judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary adminis-
trative policy within the prescribed statutory framework," id. at 425, and asserted that "[t]he
standards prescribed by the present Act, with the aid of the 'statement of considerations'




served," the Court indicated, "when Congress has specified the basic
conditions of fact upon whose existence . . . it directs that its statu-
tory command be effective." 40 Accordingly, the Court established the
following rule:
Only if we could say there is an absence of standards for the guidance of the
Administrator's action, so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding
to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed, would we bejustified
in overriding its choice of means for effecting its declared purpose . . . .'
The Yakus decision, therefore, refined the approach taken in Panama
and Schechter by moving beyond merely finding the legislative stan-
dards and evaluating them for sufficiency as guidelines for the execu-
tive branch, and toward requiring a formulation of congressional
policy precise enough to permit a determination that administrative
action was either consistent or inconsistent with that policy. Other
judicial decisions on legislative delegation after Yakus have, with
some exceptions,4" followed the rationale laid down therein."
40. Id. at 425.
41. Id. at 426. If pursued to its logical conclusion, this test would permit the upholding of
an administrative scheme under which determining whether the legislative policy had been
complied with was very difficult, although not impossible. It is therefore susceptible to judicial
expansion.
42. Of considerable constitutional significance are cases of judicial approval of exercises of
extensive regulatory controls without any explicit congressional guidance. See generally Davis,
A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CH. L. REv. 713, 715 (1969). The leading decision
illustrating this phenomenon is In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
The FPC had regulated the rates for sales of natural gas in interstate commerce pursuant to
the statutory guideline that they be "just and reasonable," 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1970), on an
individual producer basis. After experience indicated that this approach was unworkable, the
Commission abandoned it and initiated a program of fixing maximum rates for each of the
major producing areas, despite the fact that the statute did not appear to contemplate the
establishment of area rates. In upholding this administrative scheme the Court in Permian Basin
indicated that in the absence of "compelling evidence" that Congress had intended a narrow
construction of the applicable provisions of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1970), it
would be "unwilling to prohibit administrative action imperative for the achievement of an
agency's ultimate purposes." 390 U.S. at 780. Professor Davis concluded that in Permian Basin
"the whole policy of the government on the particular subject was made by the agency without
guidance from Congress." Davis, supra, at 715. While this may overstate the case, inasmuch
as rates determined on an area basis, so long as appropriate exceptions are permitted by the
FPC, may still be "just and reasonable," the Permian Basin decision does call into question
the need for statutory standards which meet the Yakus test. See also United States v. Southwest-
ern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
387 U.S. 397 (1967). On the need for requiring clear statutory standards see Merrill,
Standards-A Safeguard for the Exercise of Delegated Power, 47 NEB. L. REv. 469,473 (1968).
43. See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952) (holding that the delegation of
authority under section 20(a) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act to the Attorney
General to detain, without bail, aliens who are members of the Communist Party under certain
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The next major delegation to the President of extensive powers to
control the economy occurred with the adoption of the Defense Pro-
duction Act,44 shortly after the beginning of the Korean conflict. It
granted the 'President broad powers to mobilize the economy in sup-
port of the war effort,45 including the power to stabilize wages and
prices.4" The stabilization provisions in the Defense Production Act
were set forth in great detail, 47 leaving relatively little doubt concern-
ing the legislative policy to be implemented by the President. It is not,
therefore, surprising that no constitutional challenge to the Defense
Production Act on the basis of improper delegation reached the Su-
preme Court. 4
conditions, was not unlaful since legislative "policy and standards . .. [were] clear and
definite"); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948) (holding that Title II of the
Housing and Rent Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 196, was a valid exercise of the war power and contained
standards sufficient to "pass muster under our decisions .... "); Bowles v. Willingham, 321
U.S. 503 (1944) (decided the same day as Yakus, upholding the constitutionality of the rent
control provisions of the EPCA against an attack based on the Act's alleged grant of "unbridled
administrative discretion"). See also Quincy College & Seminary Corp. v. Burlington N., Inc.,
328 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Ill. 1971). But see DAVIS § 2.04 (asserting that the Yakus rationale
had not been uniformly applied by the Court).
44. 64 Stat. 798 (1950). Portions of the Act, as amended, are still in effect. See 50 U.S.C.
Appendix §§ 2061-68 (1970). No proclamation of emergency was incorporated in the Act, but
a presidential proclamation of national emergency still in effect today followed the enactment
by several months. Proclamation No. 2194, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (1950). For discussion of the
Defense Production Act, see Auerbach, Presidential Administration of Prices and Wages, 35
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 191, 199 (1966); Correa, The Organization for Defense Mobilization, 13
FED. BAR J. 1 (1952) (tracing evolution of President Truman's attitude toward price controls);
Note, The Defense Production Act: Choice as to Allocations, 51 COLuM. L. REV. 350 (1951).
45. The Act granted the President the authority to determine production priorities, Defense
Production Act, Title 1, 64 Stat. 799 (1950), requisition supplies and property under certain
circumstances, id. Title II, 64 Stat. at 799, increase productive capacity by providing financial
and other assistance to industry, id. Title III, 64 Stat. at 800, stabilize wages and prices, id.
Title IV, 64 Stat. at 803, promote the settlement of labor disputes, id. Title V, 64 Stat. at 812,
and impose certain controls on financial credit, id. Title VI, 64 Stat. at 812.
46. Id. Title IV, 64 Stat. 803. All controls imposed under this title during the Korean
conflict were terminated by executive order on Feb. 6, 1953. Exec. Order No. 10434, 18 Fed.
Reg. 809 (1953). This title expired on April 30, 1953. 50 U.S.C. Appendix § 2166 (1970).
47. Title V, 64 Stat. 812. This title also expired on April 30, 1953. 50 U.S.C. Appendix
(1970).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Ericson, 102 F. Supp. 376, 386-87 (D. Minn. 1951), appeal
dismissed per stipulation, 205 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1953), wherein the constitutionality of the
Defense Production Act was upheld against a due process attack. The most important case
involving executive assumption of legislative power during this period was Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which held unconstitutional a presidential order
directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate most of the nation's steel mills. The
Government, however, did not rely on the Defense Production Act or any other statutory
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The Economic Stabilization Act, challenged in Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, is the most recent in the series of enactments delegating
extensive controls over the economy to the President. Unlike its statu-
tory predecessors which resulted from exigencies of a war or economic
depression, the ESA was enacted as a preventive measure in response
to an increasingly unstable economic situation. Strong inflationary
pressures in the economy which had been continuing for several years,
combined with the anomaly of a simultaneous partial recession," led
Congress, over some objections." to adopt the ESA to provide the
President with all the tools5 it believed necessary to effectively com-
bat such pressures . 2
authority to justify this order, id. at 585-86, but rather on article II or the Constitution. The
Court indicated that the Constitution "refutes the idea that [the President] is to be a lawmaker"
and that the order constituted an attempt to legislate which could have been carried out only
by Congress. 343 U.S. at 587-88 (opinion of Black, J.).
49. See generally H.R. REP. No. 91-1330, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970); 116 CONG. REC.
7457 (1970); id. at 7507 (remarks of Congressman Albert); id. at 7512 (remarks of Congressman
Reuss). But see id. at 7508 (remarks of Minority Leader Ford).
50. H.R. REP. No. 91-1330, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970). Objections to the ESA on the
part of supporters of the legislation were centered upon the broad authority the measure would
confer upon the President. In reporting H.R. 17880, the Chairman of the House Committee on
Rules argued that the controls should be mandatory. Failure to so provide, he argued, consti-
tuted an abdication by Congress of its responsibility. 116 CONG. REC. 7457 (1970) (remarks of
Congressman Colmer). Interestingly, an amendment to H.R. 17880 was introduced under which
a joint committee of Congress would be established to make policy decisions, which would then
be implemented by the President. The sponsor of this measure reasoned that its adoption would
make "a proper distinction between the legislative and executive functions," Id. at 7520 (re-
marks of Congressman Brown). Proponents of the measure argued that non-mandatory con-
trols were better suited to managing a huge economy and that greater flexibility was needed
than existed under price controls during World War II and the Korean conflict.
51. The House bill incorporated the authority to control interest rates under section 202.
H.R. 17880, 91st Cong.. 2d Sess. (1970). The Senate bill, S. 3302, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970),
was silent concerning stabilization measures and was limited to extending the effective period
of the Defense Production Act and to providing for establishment of uniform cost accounting
procedures for certain defense contracts. 1970 U.S. CODE & CONG. Ao. NEws 3769. In confer-
ence, the Senate conferees accepted the entire House measure "except for the deletion of interest
rates from the standby controls title." H.R. REP. No. 1386, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970),
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 3784. The House conferees accepted the
omission of interest rate regulation "because the President was already given standby authority
to control interest rates .... Id.
52. H.R. REP. No. 91-1330, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970). In introducing the legislation
on the House floor, Congressman Patman referred to the measure as providing "something like
a shotgun in the corner." 116 CONG. REc. 7502 (1970). The majority agreed that the President
should take stronger measures: "[t]he lesson from history, particularly in the late 1950's, is that
economic policies which rely exclusively on fiscal and monetary measures, such as the adminis-
tration's, lead to unjustified price increases in the concentrated industries long after general
demand has slacked off." Id. at 7512 (remarks of Congressman Reuss).
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In Amalgamated Meat Cutters5 3 the court relied heavily on the
Yakus case54 and adopted the Yakus test to ascertain whether the
standards prescribed by the Economic Stabilization Act were suffi-
cient to sustain the imposition of the ninety-day wage-price
freeze-whether the legislative description of the delegated authority
"sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act
so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance
with the legislative will." 55 In finding that the Act did "sufficiently
mark the field" the court took special cognizance of several factors.
First, it noted that the statute was precise concerning the minimum
level at which prices and wages could be stabilized-at not less than
the levels prevailing on May 25, 1970.56 Second, the court pointed out
that the provision prohibiting "stabilization" of a particular industry
unless predicated upon a finding that wages and prices had risen
disproportionately in that industry 57 served to narrow the authority
conferred upon the President in comparison with that granted by the
EPCA 5 1 while at the same time clarifying the will of Congress by
indicating that Congress preferred an across-the-board imposition of
controls. 5 And third, the court concluded that the ESA was fortified
by two historical dimensions which gave meaning to the measure.
First, the legislative history, as reflected in the pertinent congressional
committee reports,6" made the goals Congress sought to achieve suffi-
53. - F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1971). The court assumed at the outset, without discussing
the matter, that the case raised a substantial constitutional question so as to justify convening
a three-judge court. Id. at - Compare California Teachers Ass'n v. Newport Mesa Unified
School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 436 (C.D. Cal. 1971), wherein the court reached precisely the
contrary conclusion. The court also concluded it had the requisite equity jurisdiction to warrant
a three-judge court, primarily because of the hardship that might otherwise inure to union
members if improperly deprived of their wage increases and because of the multiplicity of
litigation which would arise.
54. See notes 37-43 supra and accompanying text. The court distinguished the Panama and
Schechter cases as having validity "reserved for the extremist instance" and without vigor with
respect to the ESA in the context of historical experience with anti-inflation legislation. _F.
Supp. at -
55. - F. Supp. at - quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944).
Accordingly, the court points out, the question is not one of the narrowness or breadth of the
delegation. A broad delegation of authority, if drawn specifically, would not pose a problem.
- F. Supp. at
56. ESA § 202(a), 85 Stat. 38 (1971), as amended, ESA § 203(a), 85 Stat. 744 (1971).
57. ESA § 202(b), 85 Stat. 38 (1971).
58. - F. Supp. at -
59. Id. at
60. See notes 50-52 supra.
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ciently clear to compensate for the absence of a declaration of legisla-
tive purpose in the ESA.6' The absence of such a declaration was
understandable, the court noted, in view of the fact that the prior laws
had been drafted by the executive branch, while the ESA had been
drafted and enacted by Congress over the objections of the President.,'
The second clarifying historical dimension was the "'common lore'
of anti-inflationary controls" established by the EPCA, the Defense
Production Act, and agency and court decisions made under those
acts.13 While recognizing that the ESA was not intended to duplicate
the earlier measures, the court nonetheless indicated that:
those laws and their implementation do provide a validating context as against
the charge that the later statute stands without any indication to the agencies
and officials of legislative contours and contemplation."
Thus, the court concluded that "[t]here can be no doubt that in its
broad outlines the general freeze ordered by the President [in Execu-
tive Order 11615] conforms to the legislative intention." 65
The foregoing conclusion notwithstanding, the cotirt was unwill-
ing to go beyond the precise issue presented by the case to determine
whether such an executive policy could be continued for the duration
of the effective period of the ESA.66 The court did, in fact, add a
cautionary note that without the development of administrative stan-
dards and procedures to implement fairness and equity, the current
policy would "run the risk of betraying the concept of responsible
government." 7 Consequently, the court rendered a two-part judg-
ment:
first, that the statute does at least contain a standard of broad fairness and
61. The N IRA, EPCA, and Defense Production Act all contained declarations of legislative
purpose. See notes 30, 35, and 45 supra, respectively, and accompanying texts. This notwith-
standing, the court concluded that "[w]hether legislative purposes are to be obtained from
committee reports, or set forth in a separate section of the text of the law, is largely a matter
of drafting style." - F. Supp. at--
62. - F. Supp. at
63. Id. at
64. Id. at
65. Id. at - The court also noted that the interrelation between domestic economic
policies and international trade and monetary policy was so close that it enhanced the range of
power which could permissibly be delegated to the President. Id. at -
66. The wage-price freeze was initiated on August 15, 1971. The ESA was to expire on April
30, 1972. ESA § 206, 84 Stat. 900 (1970).
67. - F. Supp. at - The most serious challenge to the ESA was the charge that it
gave the President a "blank check" for internal affairs which in fact permitted him to be unfair
and inequitable without transgressing the limits of the statute, particularly since the ESA failed
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avoiding gross inequity,-leaving to the future the implementation of that
standard; second, that this statute is not unconstitutional as an excessive dele-
gation of power by the legislature to the executive for the limited term of
months contemplated by Congress to follow the initiating general freeze. 8
The court found authority for the foregoing holding in the recognition
in Yakus that a congressional delegation to the executive could pro-
perly contemplate "the formulation of subsidiary administrative pol-
icy within the prescribed statutory framework," 6 and the fact that in
Yakus the standards prescribed by the Price Administrator had been
taken into account in determining that he had complied with the
congressional will.70 In refusing to hold that the ESA was unconstitu-
tional with respect to the period after the expiration of the ninety-day
wage-price freeze, the court determined that the Cost of Living Coun-
cil was subject to the Administrative Procedure Act,71 thereby reject-
ing the Government's contention that judicial review of action taken
pursuant to the ESA's authorization could arise only under the mea-
sure's enforcement provisions.72 This provision for judicial review, in
the court's view, lessened the possible susceptibility of any future
administrative scheme established under the ESA to constitutional
to provide for a system of administrative and judicial review. The court met this argument, in
the first instance, by noting that the ESA did permit the President to make "such adjustments
as may be necessary to prevent gross inequities." ESA § 202(a), 85 Stat. 38 (1971). Compare
this language with that providing for "fair competition" in the NIRA, note 28 supra and
accompanying text, and the duty to be "generally fair and equitable" under the EPCA, note
36 supra and accompanying text. A second consideration cited by the court was that a broad
equity standard is "inherent" in a stabilization program. - F. Supp. at - Third, the
court observed that construing the statute to permit unfairness would be an "extremist" posi-
tion in view of the ESA's legislative history and the general proposition that statutes should be
construed so as to uphold their validity. Id. at - In this connection the court cited Permian
Basin. note 42 supra, for the proposition that when agencies have enormous regulatory tasks,
courts are lenient in construing the underlying statutes so as to take into account what is feasible.
And finally, the court observed that "a freeze is always arbitrary to some extent, and. . . such
arbitrariness can be sustained for a relatively short-range initial period." Id. at - (emphasis
added).
68. - F. Supp. at
69. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944).
70. - F. Supp. at -
71. Id. at - In reaching this conclusion the court noted that the Cost of Living Council
was "an agency of the United States," id. at _ and that there was no indication that
Congress had intended that the APA be inapplicable, let alone the "clear and convincing"
evidence of such legislative intent required by Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-
41 (1967). From its extended discussion of this matter it appears that the court considered this
to be of considerable importance.
72. - F. Supp. at -
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attack, because "[t]he safeguarding of meaningful judicial review is
one of the primary functions of the doctrine prohibiting undue delega-
tion of legislative powers. 7 3
It is difficult to disagree with the decision in Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, yet the case leaves the impression that Congress would be
hard put to contrive a delegation of power that would not be judicially
sustained. Several elements of the court's analysis, for example, ap-
pear to have stretched the law in the Government's favor. First, while
it is undoubtedly accepted practice to refer to the legislative history
of a statute to ascertain "legislative contours and contemplation,"74
the appropriateness of referring to earlier and different legislation for
this purpose is more questionable.15 If Congress had thought this
appropriate it could readily have so indicated in a statement of pur-
73. Id. at - This notwithstanding, the court indicated it had no basis for "speculating"
whether subsequent action taken under the ESA would become subject to challenge for failure
to provide a means of presenting objections. Id. at - The court also dismissed several other
objections to the ESA not considered in the foregoing analysis. One of these was the delegation
to the President of the power to institute wage and price controls at any time of his choosing
within the effective period of the ESA. Pointing out that "the legislature may delegate powers
that cannot meaningfully be retained .... ," id. at - the court cited three factors which
justified delegation of the timing of any action to be taken to the President: (1) that the President
was not in accord with Congress concerning the necessity for such stabilization controls, and
could not be compelled to institute them, so that Congress could only provide him with the
proper tools in case he should choose to use them, id. at ....... 4 (2) that in order to avoid an
inflationary spiral immediately prior to the institution of stabilization controls it would be
preferable to have the announcement of such policy come without prior publicity, id. at ....- 4;
(3) that Congress might not be in session at the time the President decided it was necessary to
act. Id. at
The court also held that the failure of the ESA to require a presidential declaration of
emergency prior to acting did not justify holding the ESA invalid because "emergency is instinct
in the situation." Id. at - The court also rejected an attack based on the impairment of
contracts caused by the ESA, observing that the impairment of contracts clause was applicable
only to the states, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10(1), and that the pertinent federal consideration,
whether there had been due process of law, would be determined by the administrative policy
for implementing the statute. - F. Supp. at - Finally the court determined that the ESA
authorized the application of wage-price freeze to fringe benefits. Id. at -
74. - F. Supp. at
75. But see Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 541 (1954), wherein the
Supreme Court, in upholding the authority of the government to establish administrative agen-
cies to enforce economic regulations promulgated under the Defense Production Act, read the
latter legislation with reference to the Stabilization Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 765. The reasons for
so doing in the Grand Central Aircraft case, however, are much stronger than in Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, particularly in view of specific indications in the legislative reports accompanying
the Defense Production Act which indicated that the language of the earlier statute was being
adopted. 347 U.S. at 550.
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pose incorporated in the legislation. Similarly, the conclusion that a
"broad equity standard is inherent in a stabilization program" 7 1
seems strained. Congress could easily have stipulated a duty to be
"fair and equitable," and its directive that adjustment be made "to
prevent gross inequities ' 7 7 does not quite meet this burden. In this
context, it seems appropriate to compare the decision in Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan.78 Surely the authorization in section 9(c) to the
President to prohibit the transportation of oil if production exceeded
certain state-determined limits could have been construed in a fashion
that would have permitted the President to exercise this power only
in a fair and equitable manner under even-handed regulations. Thus
it seems that, but for the intervention of the Yakus decision and the
more congenial attitude of the court in Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
the court could have attained the same result reached in Panama
Refining. Accordingly, the court's conclusion that Panama Refining
today has validity only for the extreme instance71 perhaps understates
the case.
On the other hand, the court's careful limitation of its holding to
the executive action taken in imposing the ninety-day wage-price
freeze is illustrative of the redeeming virtue in the judicial policy of
avoiding the unnecessary decision of constitutional issues, for it served
to give both the President and Congress the opportunity to mold
future action taken to implement stabilization so as to conform with
constitutional requirements. Indeed, congressional response to the
Amalgamated Meat Cutters decision has been swift. " In December,
1971, a congressional extension and amendment of the ESA was
approved." This new legislation attempts to meet all the objections
to the ESA raised in Amalgamated Meat Cutters. It indicates both a
recitation of congressional findings82 which justify the measure and a
76. - F. Supp. at -
77. ESA § 202(a), 85 Stat. 38 (1971).
78. 293 U.S. 388 (1935); see notes 22-26 and accompanying text supra.
79. _F. Supp. at -
80. S. REP. No. 507, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4007-4036 (Jan. 20, 1972), indicates that Congress specifically had the Meat Cutters
decision in mind while framing amendments to the ESA. 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 4008-09.
81. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, P.L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743 (1971),
reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws 3893, 3908 (Jan. 20, 1972).
82. ESA Amendments of 1971 § 202.
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detailed national policy statementA' It specifies in some detail the
standards to be followed by the President in administering the ESA,1'
including the duty to "be generally fair and equitable."8 5 The
amended ESA also provides explicitly for the administration of the
stabilization program." Interestingly, the amendments provide that
the APA, with the exception of the rulemaking and public informa-
tion provisions, shall not be applicable to the ESA.87 Nonetheless, it
does incorporate detailed provisions for judicial review, 8 thereby
meeting the A malgamated Meat Cutters dictum that effective judicial
review is essential. In summary, it may be said that Amalgamated
Meat. Cutters is a case in which the judiciary rendered substantial
assistance to Congress and the President in outlining the contours
necessary for proper legislation.
II. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Definition of "Agency"
The Freedom of Information Act' (FOIA) addresses itself to
"each agency ' 2 and in 1971 the courts for the first time attempted
to define that term. Although it is clear that major units, such as the
83. Id. § 4.
84. Id. § 203.
85. Id. § 203(b)(1).
86. Id. §§ 207(b)-(c).
87. Id. § 207(a). The portions of the APA which are applicable are: 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)
(public information, agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and proceedings); id. § 553 (rule
making); and id. § 555(e) (providing for prompt notice of denial of a written application).
88. Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, §§ 210-1i, 1971 U. S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 3899. Persons suffering "legal wrong" under the Act are authorized to seek
redress in any district court, regardless of the amount in controversy. ESA Amendments of 1971
§ 210(a). Exclusive appellate review is vested in a new Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals.
Id. § 211 (b). The Supreme Court may grant review by writ of certiorari. Id. § 2 11 (g).
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). For a discussion of the general operation of the Freedom of
Information Act see 1970 Duke Project 164-65 and 1969 Duke Project 72-76. See also DAVIS
(Supp. 1970) § 3A.
2. "Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows. . . ... 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a) (1970).
3. International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d
1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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